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Summary
The paper starts by outlining various links between family activities and social security as well
as main arguments for family policy and its design in particular when realised by social
security schemes. In the second part, the situation in Germany is presented as a case study
illustrating major instruments already implemented and topics under discussion for improving
the situation of families by means of social security. It is discussed in particular whether
raising children is like a contribution in kind in social insurance, especially in pension
insurance, and how to reduce the contribution burden of families within social insurance
schemes as an element of a strategy to improve human capital formation.
51. Introduction
The links between activities of the family and social security have changed over time,
especially in the process of industrialisation, when formal social security schemes were
introduced. Today there are many important interactions between families and social security
which gain a lot of attention because of demographic ageing in industrialised countries
resulting from low fertility and increasing life expectancy as well as in periods of increasing
costs in formal social security schemes. The problems as well as objectives and instruments,
however, differ depending on the economic, demographic and social conditions of a country.
The following remarks are focused on highly industrialised countries with an ageing
population.
The paper starts with some more general remarks on the topic, on links between family
activities and social security (2) and on main arguments for family policy and its design in
particular when realised by social security schemes (3). In a second part the situation in
Germany is presented as a case study illustrating major instruments already implemented (4)
and important topics that are discussed in improving the situation of families by means of
social security and effects linked to various measures (5).
The main focus of the paper is on the links between the family and social insurance. In
Germany social insurance is the major part of social security arrangements. At present the
topic „family and social insurance“ is much debated in Germany. An important reason is a
decision of the German Constitutional Court of Justice of 2001. According to this decision,
families with children have to be burdened less by contribution payments compared to
persons without children in the quite new statutory (social) long-term care insurance.1 What
makes this decisions highly interesting from a general point of view as well as in the German
political process is that government and parliament are obliged to check whether families with
children are burdened too much also in other pay-as-you go (PAYGO) financed social
insurance schemes like health insurance and particularly in pension insurance. Several
important and fundamental questions are linked hereto. The answers given can change above
all the structure of social pension insurance.
                                                
1 Long-term care insurance was introduced in Germany in 1995 as the fifth branch of social
insurance beside accident, health, unemployment and pension insurance. See for example
Schmähl and Rothgang (1996).
62. Family activities and social security
Activities of families regarding social security are manifold. First of all there are activities as
intrafamily social security. Family members are supplying support for other members of the
family for example in case of illness, in old age or when long-term care is needed. This often
are transfers in kind like nursing and providing food in case of illness etc. But there can also
be transfers in cash.
There are transfers within one generation – for example between husbands – and between
generations, from the young to the old but also vice versa. The empirical information on
intrafamily transfers in cash as well as in kind are often incomplete and less well documented
compared to activities that are linked to formal social security schemes and arrangements.
The expression formal social security is used here for those arrangements and activities that
are not realised within the (extended) family.
Intrafamily social security can reduce the demand for formal activities as well as the need to
collect taxes or social insurance contributions to finance formal activities in case of health
care etc. (see Overview 1). But one has to take into consideration that intrafamily transfers
are not without costs. This should be borne in mind when a shift from formal schemes
towards the family is proposed based on the fact that this can avoid an increase in taxes or
contributions. The same is true when a reduction in public schemes is linked to a shift
towards private arrangements like in health care or in pensions. The public debate is often
focused on the fiscal effects, especially the burden for public budgets, neglecting the
additional burden in cash or in kind for private households resulting from a shift from public to
private provision.
Regarding the link between formal social security arrangements and families it is useful to
distinguish several aspects:
(a) a cross-sectional as well as a longitudinal perspective,2
(b) how families are contributing to social security schemes (in cash and/or in kind) and what
they receive from the schemes,
(c) whether the social security schemes are public or private,
(d) financed in a PAYGO financed or capital funded scheme and
(e) whether financing (collecting revenue) is by insurance premiums, by social insurance
contributions or by taxes.
Obviously these are also dimensions that are relevant for characterising the concept of social
security and in particular social insurance schemes.
                                                
2 This, among other things, is relevant in the topic discussed below regarding externalities of
raising children in PAYGO and capital funded (pension) schemes.
7Overview 1: Families and social security
In order to accumulate claims for social security, families can pay insurance premiums for
example in private life or health insurance or can contribute to social insurance schemes. And
families pay taxes (direct and indirect taxes) which are also used to finance transfers for
families themselves.
It is often argued that families contribute much more than only by monetary transfers towards
public budgets or private insurance companies, namely by raising and educating children (see
once more Overview 1). Children will be future contributors and tax payers. The argument
often used is that without children PAYGO schemes will not survive  or will have severe
financial problems in case of low or even decreasing fertility rates because PAYGO financed
schemes need future contributors. This argument will be discussed below.
There is also the argument, that introducing and designing PAYGO financed social insurance
schemes – in particular the pension scheme – gives negative incentives for raising children,
because these schemes provide pensions in case of old age (or disability) even then when the
person never had raised a child. Children of other families will finance the living in old age not
only of those persons who have raised children but also of childless persons.3
This leads directly to arguments supporting the demand for improving the living conditions of
families which are outlined next.
                                                
3 See for example Nugent (1985); Cigno (1992); Sinn (1990, 1998).
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83. Basic economic arguments for family policy and basic
decisions in designing family policy
Reviewing the economic arguments for measures in favour of families there are in particular
two lines of argument based on allocation and distribution:
Allocation: Families contribute to the creation and improvement of human capital in a society
as a whole as well as for specific institutions like social insurance. This is an argument for
rewarding what families do, for an allocative family policy. This argument is not based on the
burden of caring for children etc. but on the welfare gains a society has by participating in the
existence of children and the education children receive within the family.
Distribution: To raise children is not without costs. There are direct costs for caring for
children etc., but also costs like foregone wages in case of not being employed or only
employed part-time instead of full-time. Some equalisation measures are needed to
compensate at least partially for these costs families have to bear.
Both types of argument are often used together when proposing specific measures. But there
is also a third type of argument.
Population Policy: A further argument is not only to reward the contribution of families for
society or social insurance by raising children but to give incentives for increasing the number
of children. This pro-natalist argument was not much used directly in Germany for a long
time.4 However, some demographers and persons very much engaged in family policy argue
in favour of a population policy pointing at the challenges arising from a reduction in the
number of people and from demographic ageing as well as from problems to compensate (at
least part) of the deficit in the number of births by importing people, that means by an active
immigration policy. The costs of integrating immigrants can be high because it must be
expected that a great number of immigrants will come from countries with quite different
cultural heritage. The reason for this is that most of our neighbour countries and highly
industrialised countries in general are more or less facing a similar demographic development
and therefore will not be a remarkable source of immigrants for Germany.
In economic literature the argument based on allocation is a prominent one. It is also
important in the debate on social security and family policy. Raising children has positive
externalities for the whole society and especially for those who did not raise children.
Families therefore should be compensated in general and in particular within social insurance
schemes.
                                                
4 After the Second World War it was a taboo for many years to argue along this line because of
the negative experience made in Germany during the Nazi period with a „population policy“.
9It is sometimes argued by economists that PAYGO schemes give negative incentives for
having children – children are no more necessary for parents as provider of old-age security.
The elderly – so the argument – will receive a pension in a collective pension scheme
whether they have raised children or not. Therefore these schemes are a major reason for
the low fertility rates to be seen in many industrialised countries. However, empirical
evidence on this is not convincing at all. This is not surprising because it is difficult to isolate
the effect of the introduction and the design of PAYGO schemes on fertility behaviour. Even
the cause and the effect are not clear. For example, if the extended family as provider of
protection and support in old age becomes weaker this may stimulate the introduction of
formal pension schemes and not vice versa. This was a major reason, for example, to
introduce social insurance in Germany in the late 19th century.
However, the introduction of funded schemes – following the line of argument regarding
negative incentive effects on fertility – would also reduce the necessity to have children as
means of old-age security. The introduction of a funded scheme would even burden families
additionally because – as is well known – the shift from PAYGO financing (here intrafamily
PAYGO financing) to funding increases the burden of those being in their working age –, if
the level of old-age provision for the present elderly is not reduced remarkably.
When proposing measures in favour of families it has to be decided in what phase of the life
cycle these measures shall become effective. It is obvious that additional costs for families
will arise in the period of raising children, direct costs for financing the living of children and
opportunity costs in case of staying at home and being not employed (or employed on a
reduced level). If – like in Germany – claims in social insurance are based on contribution
payments mainly from labour income, not being employed affects future pension benefits.
There are in principle two different strategies to cope with this problem of direct costs and
opportunity costs during the period of raising children: To improve the possibilities of parents
to combine caring for children and employment. This is in particular depending on
infrastructure like care facilities, all-day schooling etc. This, for example, cannot be realised
by measures of social insurance. Another approach is to improve the possibility for parents to
stay at home and care for children and not to be employed. This must not be focused on
women alone but on both parents. Here above all transfers in cash can help to give the
opportunity to stay at home for some time and to spend more time for child care. But also
measures within social insurance may help to realise this objective.
Behind these two approaches there are different normative positions, especially whether for
example to be employed is the norm and therefore everything should be designed in such a
way as to realise employment also of both parents – and in particular of mothers.5 Or
                                                
5 This requires – as already mentioned – a specific infrastructure. But also social security schemes
can be designed in such a way that they provide incentives for taking up employment while
staying at home becomes more costly. For example proposals for a minimum contribution rate (in
pension insurance) for all citizens, independent whether employed or not, could give an incentive
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whether caring for children within the family (at least for some years) without being
employed is supported and looked upon as useful for society.6
There can also be measures to improve the financial situation of parents when they are
retired. This can be done for example by crediting pension claims because of former periods
of child care. While this becomes effective in old age by a higher pension it can, however,
also be argued that this reduces the costs in pension insurance in the pre-retirement period
because, if the mother or father wanted to accumulate this additional pension claim, she or he
had to pay a higher contribution.
In the following, the German situation is outlined with regard to some basic information on
how families are treated within social insurance (4). Then the present debate on improving
the conditions of families within social insurance and social security in general – caused by a
decision of the Constitutional Court – as well as the basic instruments proposed in the
discussion will be analysed (5).
4. Transfers to families from public budgets and by social
insurance in Germany
There exists a great variety of transfers in favour of families in Germany, mainly from public
budgets. Overview 2 gives some macro-data. Beside transfers in cash and tax expenditures
for families with children by different programs (as direct instruments of family policy like
child benefits, tax allowances, maternity, parental and childcare leave, but also as transfers
linked for example to housing subsidies) there are price subsidies and transfers in kind like
public education without fees, public child care facilities. The global figures on public
expenditure for families with children given in Overview 2, however, are not comprehensive
regarding public instruments and neglect private expenditure, for example those provided by
firms (employers). Starting in the year 2002, there are now also additional subsidies (transfer
payments or tax expenditure) for families in case of saving in certified types of private
pensions.7
                                                                                                                                         
for taking up employment – or may make it necessary by financial reasons because of the
additional contribution burden.
6 For an overview of different approaches see Kaufmann et al. (2001).
7 These certified capital funded products are designed as a substitute for a reduction of PAYGO
financed social pensions. For a discussion on this as well as the regulations regarding private
pensions see Schmähl (2003).
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Overview 2: Public expenditure for families with children in Germany
– year 2000 –
thousand million Euro
tax expenditure 37.3
transfers in cash from public budgets (federal,
state and local level) 26.9
among this
contribution payments to social pension 
insurance for years of child care 11.5
transfers in kind from public budgets 1) 71.0
transfers in cash from social insurance 2) 16.0
total about    150
1) 1999
2) including “contribution expenditure” (contribution-free insurance) in health
insurance of children only and transfers in kind in case of pregnancy and
motherhood
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2002: 19).
According to this overview by the German Bundesbank (2002) about 16 thousand million
Euro (more than 10 % of all public expenditure for families) are financed by social insurance
schemes. But there is another important sum financed by federal budget but relevant for
social pension insurance, namely contributions paid by the federal public budget to social
pension insurance for years of child care that are credited in the individual account of social
pension insurance. This is a relevant topic when discussing the role of transfers for families
within social pension insurance (see below). Taking these two positions together, about 20 %
of all family-oriented public transfers are linked to social insurance in Germany.
In social insurance schemes there exist a variety of measures focused on families. Without
being comprehensive the following instruments shall be mentioned (see Overview 3):
Overview 3: Instruments used in social insurance in favour of families
health insurance long-term care
insurance
unemployment
insurance
pension insurance
coverage of non-working spouse and children
without own contributions
higher benefits for
insured persons
with children
credits for years of
child care
benefits in case of
pregnancy and
motherhood
contribution to pension
insurance in case of
family care
fictitious increase
of earnings
higher widow(er)’s
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pension if children
were born
– In unemployment insurance unemployment benefits for insured people with children are
higher compared to benefits for persons without children.
– In health insurance and long-term care insurance children as well as the non-working
spouse (that means not being employed) are covered without paying own contributions or
without the husband paying contributions for them. In health insurance there are also
benefits in case of pregnancy and maternity.
– In pension insurance several instruments are used in favour of families. Overview 4
gives information on five instruments used in Germany.8 As already mentioned, a
contribution is paid from the federal budget in case of caring for children (for 3 years per
child based on average earnings). This affects the pension of the insured person. The
rules for crediting these years has changed over time. In the future there will also be a
bonus for widow’s/widower’s pensions in case the person had a child. Several other
instruments are used to improve the pension benefit in old age or in case of disability if
contributors had periods of child care during their working life.
Overview 4: Instruments in social pension insurance focused on families
(1) Crediting years of child care
– number of years
– Earnings Points (EP) per year
1986 1 year 0.75 EP
but own earnings replace the credit
1992 3 years 0.75 EP
1999 gradual increase to
                                                
8 For a better understanding of these instruments it is necessary to mention that the individual
pension claim in social pension insurance is based above all on the following two factors in case
of employment:
(1) the relative amount of gross earnings, i.e. individual gross earnings (in a specific year) divided
by the average gross earnings of all insurance persons in this year (Earnings Points) and (2) the
number of years of insurance. If individual earnings is just as high as average earnings, one
Earnings Point is credited in the individual account in social pension insurance. Pension
calculation takes into account the sum of all Earnings Points. In addition to Earnings Points from
periods of employment there are for example Earnings Points based on contributions from health
insurance, unemployment and long-term care insurance as well as by the state. But there can be
also a crediting of Earnings Points without a contribution payment (e.g. for some years of
schooling).
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1 EP (July 2000)
but now in addition to own earnings
(maximum up to 2002 about 1.8 EP = contribution ceiling)
(2) 1992
Fictitious years of insurance in case of child care to compensate existing gaps in
insurance career as a precondition to fulfil waiting periods for taking up e.g. early
retirement pension for women at age 60.
(3) 2001
Fictitious increase of low earnings in case of child care (age 4-10) if earnings is
below average earnings by 50 %, maximum 1 EP. Precondition: waiting period of 25
years. 10 years of fictitious years of insurance in case of child care (see 2) are counted
for this waiting period.
(4) 2001
Supplementing contribution payment of long-term care insurance (to pension
insurance) by 50 % up to 1 EP (maximum) in case of care for a handicapped child (up
to age 18).
(5) 2001
Widow(er)’s pension will be reduced from 60 % to 55 % of the pension of the former
spouse and all own income will be taken into account for the calculation of the benefit.
But there will be an increase of the pension for the first child by 2 EP and 1 EP for
other children.
In case of caring for frail elderly by family members the long-term care funds pay a
contribution to pension insurance in favour of the caregiver to improve the pension claim
which is expected to become lower because of not taking up employment because of the
care given to (in most cases) a family member. The contribution payment (and therefore also
the pension claim linked to the contribution) differs according to the category of care
dependency.9 In case of caring for an disabled child this contribution is upgraded.
Regarding financing of these elements of family policy used in social insurance schemes,
there exist important differences. For example, in health and long-term care insurance the
contribution-free coverage of children or the non-working spouse is financed by contribution
revenue of all other contributors. That means, the expenditure are financed by earnings-
related contributions (contributions based on gross earnings up to a ceiling) and paid on equal
part by employees and employers.
In contrast to this, it was a clear political decision that crediting years in case of child care in
the social pension insurance is a matter of family policy. Because the (federal) state is
responsible for family policy, all tax payers are obliged to finance these measures. It is
obvious that the effect on income distribution is different if financing is by proportional
earnings-related contributions (up to a ceiling) or by a (progressive) tax on income or a value
added tax.
                                                
9 There exist three degrees in the new German long-term care insurance scheme.
14
The existing differences for example in financing of family policy in health insurance as well
as in long-term care insurance compared to pension insurance can be explained to a large
extent from history: In the founding period of Germany’s social insurance in the eighties of
the 19th century chancellor Bismarck could not realise financing part of health insurance by
taxes. A few years later, when pension insurance was established, 30 % of pension
expenditure were financed from tax revenue beside employer’s and employee’s
contribution.10
Until some years ago, there was strong resistance in the German public debate regarding
partial tax financing in health insurance and the effect in particular on employer’s
contributions (as non-wage labour costs). This now starts to change mainly because of
increasing contribution rates in health insurance. In particular, part of benefits in health
insurance towards families is looked upon now as family policy by some actors. While family
policy in general is financed from tax revenue in Germany, it is argued that a shift in financing
from contribution to tax financing should take place.
5. The present debate in Germany on improving the conditions
for families in social insurance
As already mentioned, in March 2001 the Constitutional Court decided that in long-term care
insurance there is at present an unequal treatment of insured persons with and without
children which violates the constitution. The main argument was that insured persons raising
children contribute additionally beside their contribution payment in cash, because a PAYGO
financed scheme needs future generations. Therefore, families produce a contribution in kind.
This second type of contribution is according to the Court not – at least not adequately –
recognised. Therefore, the Court demanded a reduction of contribution payments in cash for
families. This has to be implemented by the legislator up to the end of 2004. But the legislator
has also to examine whether the effect criticised in long-term care insurance does also exist
in other PAYGO financed social insurance schemes.
5.1 Raising children as a contribution in kind in pension insurance?
This instruction by the Constitutional Court can have far reaching effects particularly in social
pension insurance. If the Court’s argument that raising children is a contribution in kind is
accepted in pension insurance, this would undermine the present earnings-(income-)related
concept of pension insurance. If pension claims are based on the fact of raising children this
                                                
10 An important argument to realise this was the fact that the introduction of the pension insurance
reduced the expenditure for poor people on the local level.
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only can mean, that the pension claim is not earnings-(income-) related but only flat rate. This
would change the present concept of the German pension insurance scheme fundamentally.
There is now a debate going on, how to react to the demand of the Constitutional Court. It
will be important to analyse the arguments of the Court as well as the effects of instruments
that can be used to improve the financial situation of families during the period of raising
children.
The argument that raising children is a contribution to PAYGO financed schemes and should
be rewarded within the pension scheme was already put forward in the past and sounds very
plausible for the moment. Since many years, proposals have been existing to make the
contribution payments depending on the number of children.11 This can be done in principle
by different contribution rates but also by implementing a flat rate allowance (depending on
the number of children) into the formula for calculating the contribution payment. On the
other hand, there exist proposals to differentiate the pension benefit according to the number
of children, for example giving the full pension benefit only to those insured persons that have
raised 2 children (more or less the number of children necessary for realising a constant
number of births).
The main argument behind these proposals as well as the decision of the Constitutional Court
is that raising children has positive externalities for other persons. In particular, the children
will be potential future contributors to social insurance. The external effect of this has to be
internalised by improving the income position of families.
Before discussing different instruments for internalising externalities, some more general
questions will be mentioned that have to be answered when deciding on the ways and means
to improve the conditions for families raising children.
Regarding externalities, for example regarding future financing of social insurance, not only
the number of children is decisive but above all the human capital of children and the future
productivity of children during their working life. But how can the externalities of raising
children be quantified? This – following the argument of those who base their proposals on
externalities – has to be done in all areas, that means in the different social insurance
schemes as well as for the whole society in general. Following this line of argument, it is not
adequate to limit the improvement of living conditions of families only to those families who
are contributing to a PAYGO scheme. For example, if parents are members of a mandatory
funded scheme – as in Germany for professional associations like lawyers, doctors, architects
and some other groups of self-employed – then their children will to a high percentage
become members of a PAYGO scheme in the future, while on the other hand parents being
                                                
11 See Schmähl (1988) for a discussion on this and for further references. Horstmann (1996) gives an
overview of different proposals how to compensate families within social pension insurance in
case of raising children.
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now member of a PAYGO scheme may have children who later contribute to a funded
scheme.
This already points at a difficulty if the argument for improving the conditions for families is
based on effects for PAYGO schemes only. And it would be a misunderstanding of reality to
assume that funded schemes are not depending on future gainfully employed people. It
cannot be assumed that the development of capital markets is independent of the
development of employment and the labour market as well as of the age structure of the
population and thereby the number of persons saving and accumulating financial capital and
those persons who reduce their capital stock (financial assets) to finance their living in old
age.
Coming back to the question how to quantify the externalities as a base for calculating how
much, for example, the contribution burden of contributors with children should be reduced
compared to those contributors without children, one needs some information regarding the
effect of the activities of the family on human capital development of their children. This is
not only depending on parents’ activities. There are other influencing factors like schooling,
training and retraining in firms, own investment by children themselves and how they use their
ability to earn money as a base for contributing to social insurance schemes or paying taxes.
Taking these aspects into account, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the ways and
means for improving the income position of families for internalising externalities (and not for
compensating economic costs of raising children):
– These measures cannot be targeted only at parents contributing to PAYGO schemes
but also have to include members of those mandatory funded schemes that are
elements of the first tier of pension arrangements.
– If there are externalities for several social insurance schemes as well as for the society
in general, then implementation of measures into each of the schemes – despite the
fact of great difficulties to quantify externalities – would undermine transparency of
family policy and would increase transaction costs. The conclusion is that these
measures should not be financed from specific levies for specific schemes like
earnings-based social insurance contributions of different branches of social insurance
but in principle from tax revenue. In order to increase transparency and to improve the
possibility of a rational family policy, an integration of various measures within one
organisation might be useful. This will be discussed below.
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5.2 Reducing the contribution burden of families – instruments and
effects
It has to be discussed and politically decided in Germany how to react to the request of the
Constitutional Court to reduce the contribution burden of families within social insurance
schemes. If this is regarded to be necessary (not only in long-term care insurance but in other
schemes as well), then it has to be decided who has to finance the deficit resulting from a
reduction of contribution payments of families and what is the adequate assessment base for
these payments.
One possibility often mentioned in the German discussion is to implement different
contribution rates according to the number of children. This could only be realised for the
employee’s part of contribution payments only and not for the employer’s contributions
because of otherwise distorting effects regarding labour costs on the labour market.
Contributors without children would have to pay higher contribution rates compared to those
contributors with children. The reduction of contribution rates for contributors with children
affects these contributors differently according to their earnings: Contributors with higher
earnings would gain more per child in absolute terms compared to those with low earnings.
Therefore, it was proposed to use a fixed absolute (flat rate) amount of an allowance per
child. Here, the absolute reduction of the contribution payment would be identical for all
contributors but relatively higher (compared to the individual earnings) for those in the lower
income brackets.
Introducing an allowance into the contribution formula would have several additional effects:
Up to the ceiling the contribution scale would become (indirectly) progressive. The effective
contribution rate (defined as individual contribution payment as ratio of individual gross
earnings) would remain below the contribution rate12 and is regressive for earnings above the
(upper) ceiling. Overview 5 illustrates the effect of introducing an allowance into the formula
for calculating the contribution payment.
The introduction of an allowance would not affect the individual pension claim, because in
German social pension insurance the pension claim is based on the amount of individual
earnings and not (as in a defined contribution scheme) on the amount of the contribution
payment. However, the contribution revenue would be reduced by introducing an allowance
as well as in reducing the contribution rate for families with children.
                                                
12 Only if the upper ceiling is increased by the amount of the allowance, contributors with earnings
at the new ceiling would have an effective contribution rate just as high as the (formal)
contribution rate. For a detailed discussion of effects of allowances in calculating the
contribution payment see Schmähl (1977: 165-190).
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Then it has to be decided how to finance the deficit of the social insurance scheme in case
of reducing the contribution burden of contributors with children. As already argued13 the
adequate way to finance this deficit is from tax revenue and not by earnings-related
contributions up to a ceiling – as it is done at present in health and long-term care insurance in
Germany because of contribution-free insurance of non-working spouse and children. There
are distributive arguments against this (because expenditure for family policy would not be
financed according to the ability to pay but only based on income from labour up to a ceiling)
as well as arguments regarding the effect on the labour market: Financing family policy by
earnings-related contributions increases labour costs which negatively affects labour demand
and may increase unemployment.14
                                                
13 Either on the base of utility of raising children for the society in general or regarding the lack in
transparency and goal-oriented targeting of measures of family policy in case of trying to
compensate externalities in several different branches of social insurance, other branches for
providing social security etc.
14 This is discussed in Schmähl (1998).
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Overview 5: Effective contribution rate in case of an allowance
Disentangling employee’s and employer’s contributions – which would result from the above
mentioned two strategies (different contribution rates or allowances) – could stimulate (at
least in Germany) a more fundamental discussion about the assessment base for employer’s
contributions. This was discussed in Germany (as well as in some other European countries
like Austria and Belgium) in the past. It was proposed not to base employer’s contributions on
earnings only but on (gross or net) value added of the firm. Because of the different ratios of
labour costs to value added in different branches of the economy contribution payments
based only on earnings are burdening in particular labour-intensive production.15 Such a value
added levy of employers, however, would in fact be a tax that cannot be allocated to the
individual employee as in case of earnings-related employer’s contributions which are part of
                                                
15 For a detailed analysis see Schmähl et al. (1984) and Schmähl (1992).
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individual earnings of the employee. In a pension scheme like in Germany, where the idea of
a close contribution-benefit link is important at least up to now, the shift from earnings-related
employer’s contributions to value added tax would dilute the contribution-benefit link and
make the social insurance scheme more interpersonally redistributive.
It is obvious that a decision about adequate financing of family policy implemented into social
insurance schemes depends also on the concept of social insurance that is seen as relevant in
a country. If social insurance schemes are highly redistributive, the above argument of
diluting the contribution-benefit link seems not to be relevant. Of course, the argument of a
lack of transparency, higher transaction costs and the problems in properly targeting all
elements of family policy which are distributed over several schemes and public budgets
remains relevant.
To base pension claims on raising children – the contribution in kind – in German pension
insurance, would require that the pension claim is not income-related but flat rate. This,
however, also would change the German pension scheme fundamentally, because up to now
the scheme and the formula for calculating pensions are explicitly earnings-related.
In the case of Germany and in particular regarding the social pension insurance instead of
differentiating contribution rates or contribution payments (by an allowance), the following
approach seems to be preferable if – as demanded by the Constitutional Court – a reduction
of contribution burden for families shall be realised: This can be done by direct transfer
payments financed by general public revenue (a) either to the pension insurance or (b) to the
household of the contributor.
In case (a) the contribution payments of families with children would be reduced and the
resulting deficit of the pension insurance would be compensated from general public revenue.
In case (b) families raising children would receive a direct transfer payment aiming at a
reduction of their contribution or – more generally – of their provision for old age in a pension
scheme belonging to the first tier of the pension arrangements (that means arrangements
being the base for old-age security of groups of people, whether funded or PAYGO
financed). The amount of this reduction could be equal per child.
It could, however, be argued that financing of family policy from general tax revenue may
burden families, especially if a high percentage of tax revenue is collected via indirect
taxation – like value added tax, purchase taxes or ecological tax. To avoid this, there could be
for example a surcharge in income tax (whether earmarked for family policy or not) designed
in such a way, that families with children are more or less exempted from paying this levy.
To go one step further in trying to make the effects of family policy more transparent and to
improve the possibility to realise the political objectives of family policy an institution could be
21
established which handles at least all transfers in cash in favour of families as well as the
financing of these transfers (a „caisse familiale“, in German „Familienkasse“).16
It is, however, not intended by the German government to realise such an approach. A main
reason is that government tries to reduce the volume of the federal budget and not to extend
it by taking over tasks that are now realised within social insurance or at least the financing of
these tasks by tax revenue.17 Therefore, the German Government plans to fulfil the demands
of the Constitutional Court regarding long-term care financing by increasing the contribution
burden of those contributors who are not caring for children. This additional burden will also
affect those contributors, who raised children in the past. This measure is focused on the
period of child caring and therefore is not an instrument to compensate families because they
raised children which produces (positive) external effects for other persons in various
institutions or for the society in general.
5.3 Financing of family policy and human capital formation
In general, there seems to be a great consent in Germany about the objective of improving
the economic situation of families with children during the period of raising and educating
children. The realisation of this can be an important element in a strategy of increasing human
capital. The development of human capital is of decisive importance for future productivity
gains and improvement of the well-being of the population. Improving the possibilities for
higher productivity by education within the family – among other things also by passing on
social values – as well as in education in general, training and retraining in an ageing society
seems to be of utmost importance. Therefore, it should be decided how to allocate tax
revenue for different types of capital formation. My personal view is that in Germany recent
decisions in allocating scarce public resources aim too much towards formation of financial
capital and not into human capital formation. However, these decisions were very much
according to the “spirit of the age“ (“Zeitgeist“) and were in the interest of influential actors
of the capital markets. Decisions in German pension policy illustrate this very clearly.18 The
discussion on the role of families and how to improve their economic situation could, however,
be a chance to redirect public attention as well as public money more towards human capital
which is a central base for future economic competitiveness and development as well as for
the economic well-being of the population.
                                                
16 This proposal is not new in Germany. It was an element of the proposals of an expert commission
of the federal government for preparing pension reform in 1997, but not implemented.
17 The obligation to fulfil the Maastricht stability criteria is an important political argument to repel
proposals like the one presented above.
18 The instruments for realising this are discussed in Schmähl (2003).
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